Based on recently discovered material in German archives, this book
fundamentally changes our understanding of German military planning before World War I
On the basis of newly discovered or long-neglected documents in German military archives, this book gives the first description of Schlieffen’s war plans in 1904 and 1905 and Moltke’s plans from 1906 to 1914. It explodes unfounded myths concerning German war planning, gives the first appraisal of the actual military and political factors that influenced it, proves conclusively that there never was a "Schlieffen Plan," and reveals Moltke’s strategy for a war against Russia from 1909 to 1912. Tracing the decline in the German military position and the recognition by 1913 that Germany would be forced to fight outnumbered on both the eastern and western fronts, it is an essential read for anyone with an interest in World War I.
|Publisher:||The History Press|
|Product dimensions:||6.10(w) x 9.20(h) x 0.70(d)|
About the Author
Terence Zuber is a retired army officer who spent eight years conducting counterintelligence operations against the Stasi. He is the author of The Battle of the Frontiers, German War Planning 18911914, and The Months Myth.
Most Helpful Customer Reviews
This is a followup to Zuber's "Inventing the Schlieffen Plan (2003). Once again Zuber launches into a review and analysis of the German staff's war planning, war gaming and staff rides to prove that there never was a "Schlieffen Plan" as claimed by various sources. The Schlieffen Plan of course refers to the opening moves claimed to have been executed by the German Army in August, 1914. The goal being to circle Paris to the west and drive the French Army into Switzerland or envelop and destroy the army. By studying the archives of the German Army, Zuber believes there is no evidence that an S. Plan ever was studied, tested, or really proposed. I cannot argue against his theory nor the result of his research. He looked in the records and documents, not me. His argument is convincing to my way of thinking. However, there are many vocal opponents to his views. At the end of the book, all I will say is that he names names, and calls out other historians for their theories and work. Given the data Zuber presents, I have to side with him in ths argument. I gave the book 4 stars since at times I found it difficult to follow all the data he presents. It is a fairly short book (187 pp including maps and notes) so it is a quick read.I recommend this book as an interesting contra view on the long held acceptance of the Schllieffen Plan as the fool-proof way in which Germany intended to win the two-front war against France and Russia.